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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper considers the status of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the light of 
the new Financial Perspective 2007-2013. Even if in theory the ENP could have been 
a valid substitute for enlargement, it does not seem to have reached its aim of 
providing the perspective of a real substitute for full membership. Considering the 
figures of the new Financial Perspective 2007-2013, the issue of market access, and 
the internal power dynamics of the EU, we see that it is hardly conceivable that the 
ENP could ever give to its neighbours the same economic advantages that 
membership gives to the poorer members of the EU. The consideration of some 
related basic issues of EU institutional reform concludes the paper. 
                                                 
1 Thanks are due to Susan Senior Nello, Annalisa Meloni, Marcello Di Filippo for useful 
suggestions. Some of the arguments of the present paper were originally contained in a short 
report presented to a conference on The Challenges of European Neighbourhood Policy. 
Rome, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26-27 November 2004 (Alberto Chilosi, “The European 
Neighbourhood Policy: A Substitute for Eu Membership or A Consolation Prize?” Documenti 
IAI IAI0419). 
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1. PRODI’S PROMISE 
1.1 Introduction.  
Facing the greatest enlargement of its history (in terms of countries, territory, and population), 
and a possibly long interruption of the enlargement process, the EU has devised the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (from now on ENP) in order to furnish to its further neighbours, left 
outside of immediate, or any, prospects of enlargement, some compensation, and a kind of 
comprehensive framework for their relations with the EU.2 Launching the idea of ENP in 2002 
President Prodi made the famous promise: “everything but institutions.”3 The promise refers to 
the possibility for neighbours to have the same treatment and economic advantages of EU 
membership, except the participation in EU institutions, through a process of gradual 
homologation to EU’s membership requirements. Has Prodi’s promise been fulfilled, or is it 
going to be fulfilled? We believe it has not, nor is it likely to be. Considering the figures of the 
new Financial Perspective 2007-2013, the issue of market access, and the internal power 
dynamics of the EU, we see that it is hardly conceivable that the ENP could ever give to its 
neighbours the same economic advantages that membership gives to the poorer members of 
the EU.  
1.2 Economic Advantages for Neighbours of “Everything but Institutions”. 
Let us consider now what are the advantages of membership and how could non-members 
share them. Considering the economic aspects only, the main advantages are three: The first 
refers to the creation of public goods, such as standards and norms, that can benefit economic 
activity, notably trade (not only with the EU), through predictability and uniformity. This can 
benefit non-members provided they accept those standards and norms,4 but does not require in 
                                                 
2 For a recent general survey of ENP and of its economic implications see the recent article by 
Michaela Dodini and Marco Fantini,” The EU Neighbourhood Policy: Implications for 
Economic Growth and Stability.” Journal of Common Market Studies, 2006 Volume 44. 
Number 3. pp. 507–32.  
(Downloadable from http://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jcmkts/v44y2006ip507-532.html.) 
3 Cf. Romano Prodi, “A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability.” Sixth 
ECSA-World Conference. Jean Monnet Project, Brussels, 5-6 December 2002, 
SPEECH/02/619.  
4 Moreover there are some good reasons for a neighbouring country to acquire at least those 
parts of the acquis concerning standards and regulations (chapter 1), which are instrumental in 
having her wares accepted without fuss in the EU markets, as well as those favouring 
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principle an especially devised Neighbourhood Policy (not any more than the lack of 
participation in the European Monetary Union may hinder countries outside the EU from 
adopting the euro as a legal tender).5 The EU does not hold a copyright on its legislation and 
can only be happy if anybody else decides to mirror it.6 However, neighbours cannot take part 
in the decision process of establishing those norms and regulations, and of devising those 
standards, even if they can in principle influence the agreements that can be reached in the 
framework of the international organizations to which they may belong, which may constrain 
the establishment of those standards and regulations.7 Still EU legislation creates standards for 
its neighbours, which in itself amounts to a public good. The neighbourhood policy includes 
an operational structure for assisting the neighbours (as the EU does with candidates) that can 
facilitate the adoption of EU standards and regulations. This could be of some help for trade, 
especially with respect to improving the opportunity for access to EU market through 
elimination, in particular, of the technical barriers to trade. The second possible advantage 
refers to the net benefit (this means net of contribution to the EU budget) of aid and financial 
assistance to the poorer members of the Union. This kind of assistance would be certainly 
provided to neighbouring countries if they were to be admitted to the EU (with the possible 
                                                                                                                                                         
investment from EU countries (in particular chapter 5, concerning company laws). One could 
also consider the saving in legislative time and resources needed to prepare their own 
legislation, even if in turn adaptation of existing legislation to the acquis requires legislative 
time and resources. This applies in particular to those transitional and developing countries 
that are in the process of transforming their legal system anyway. However the acquis reflects 
the needs and opportunities of prosperous advanced economies and it may be hardly 
compatible with the different economic and social structure of more backward poorer 
economies. In particular one may doubt that Mutual Recognition Agreements, facilitating 
mutual trade, could be possible between countries at very different levels of technological and 
economic development. This presents a challenge both in the perspective of membership and 
in that of participating to the single market and the EEA (European Economic Area). In the 
end, as often is the case in economic matters (and not only in those), it is just an issue of trade 
offs, and the balance of costs and benefits depends on the specific circumstances, but 
especially on the possible response of the EU. 
5 As in the notable case of Montenegro. 
6 The same applies with respect to human rights, democracy, protection of minorities, 
establishment of a functioning market economy, in short all the Copenhagen criteria. 
7 Of course neighbouring countries can attempt to influence the decisional processes inside the 
EU by representing their specific interests and concerns, but this can be effected in the usual 
framework of diplomatic representations or of agreements concerning bilateral relations. The 
ENP as such does not innovate in this respect, as it would, say, if it were to bring about a 
multilateral forum in which neighbours could collectively influence EU’s decisional processes. 
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exception of Israel since it is much better off than the others).8 The third benefit refers to the 
possibility of integration between neighbours’ and EU markets (“a stake in the Internal 
Market”), as characterized by the four freedoms (free movement of goods, services, persons 
and capital). In turn homologation of legislation and market access could bring the additional 
benefit of stimulating foreign direct investment that has performed an important role in the 
progress of the economies of Central European new members as well as of the more backward 
EU economies in the past.9 As we shall see, on the issue of aid and of market access the 
promise has not been fulfilled, and possibly could never be, at least to a degree that would be 
equivalent, even if only in perspective, to membership. It is true that in theory assistance to a 
relatively poor neighbour could be provided in the same amount and according to similar 
modalities as assistance to a relatively poor member, and an analogous consideration can be 
made with respect to the opening up of the internal market to neighbours. But this is quite 
unlikely in practice because of political economy considerations and the way the internal 
dynamics of the EU does operate.10
2. AID AND ASSISTANCE.  
Let us start with aid, and make some elementary calculations, on the basis of the recently 
agreed Financial Perspective for the years 2007-2013.11 What do the poorer insiders (and in 
particular the new EU members) and the even poorer neighbours get in the framework of the 
                                                 
8 Somebody unacquainted with EU mores could be puzzled at the idea of Israel as a neighbour, 
since it does not have a common border with the EU. But for the purpose of neighbourhood 
policy countries that are separated from EU borders only by a stretch of the Mediterranean Sea 
are also considered as neighbours. Even countries that have a border with Turkey, a candidate 
member, such as those of Western Caucasus, are considered to be neighbours, but not the 
other countries bordering Turkey: this would stretch the notion of neighbourhood really too 
far. 
9 On this point see Susanne Milcher and Ben Slay, “The Economics of the ‘European 
Neighbourhood Policy’: An Initial Assessment,” paper for the conference “Europe after the 
Enlargement”, Case Foundation, Warsaw, April 8-9, 2005; downloadable from 
http://www.case.com.pl/dyn/plik--4592639.pdf. 
10 Cf. Richard Baldwin and Charles Wyplosz, Economics of European Integration. 
Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill Education, 2004, ch. 3, pp. 73 f. As to the limitations to the 
prospects of the EU opening up its market to its neighbours in the areas where they are most 
able to compete (and that often are in the sensitive areas where the EU has lost competitive 
advantage) see. Susanne Milcher and Ben Slay, “The Economics of the ‘European 
Neighbourhood Policy’: An Initial Assessment,” op. cit. 
11 Truly speaking Prodi did not mention aid in his speech, but aid is for the poorer members an 
important advantage of EU membership. 
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next Financial Perspective? Some simple figures suffice to give the overall picture. The 
appropriation for the ENPI (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument) for the next 
Financial Perspective following the recent interinstitutional agreement is envisaged as 11,967 
million euros (down from the 14,929 million initially proposed)12, only slightly more than the 
Pre-Accession Instrument (11,565).13 Here one can already immediately perceive the much 
lesser financial effort of the EU towards its poorer non-candidate neighbours (“the countries of 
the south and eastern Mediterranean, the Western NIS and the countries of the southern 
Caucasus”) than towards countries that are candidate (Croatia and Turkey) or potential 
candidate (the countries of Western Balkans),14 considering the lesser number and 
disproportionately lower population of the latter groups.15 But the difference becomes really 
impressive if one considers the shares of the budget earmarked for cohesion (308,041) and for 
CAP (now prudishly renamed “Preservation and Management of Natural Resources”: 
371,344) that really dwarf the ENPI. Of course members, unlike neighbours, contribute to 
financing those programmes. Let us consider therefore the net EU budgetary contribution in 
favour of the 4 poorest EU (15) members in 2003 (the data for the year 2004 are in principle 
less significative, because of the accession of the new 10 members in mid year, but in reality 
they are not much different, indeed somewhat higher on the whole, for the 4 countries 
                                                 
12 Cf. Commission of the European Communities, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council Laying Down General Provisions Establishing a European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument”, Brussels, 29.9.2004 (http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/com/pdf/2004/com2004_0628en01.pdf). 
13 MEMO/06/213 Date: 24/05/2006. 
14 In principle the ENPI refers to following countries (the figures between brackets refer to 
millions of population): Algeria (32), Belarus (10), Egypt (76), Israel (6), Jordan (6), Lebanon 
(4), Libya (6), Moldova (4), Morocco (32), Palestinian Authority (4), Syria (18), Tunisia (10), 
Ukraine (48), Armenia (3), Azerbaijan (8) Georgia (5) and Russia (144). Russia however has 
not accepted, for prestige reasons, the ENP framework, but rather a so-called Strategic 
Partnership that in practice amounts more or less to the same (in the sense that it is for Russia 
to adapt to EU rules and regulations rather than the other way round). The candidate (2) and 
potential candidate (5) countries are: Croatia (4), Turkey (69); Bosnia (4), Serbia and 
Montenegro (11: recently separated), Albania (4), Macedonia (2). 
15 Among the neighbours, however, one country is not poor (Israel), and others (Belarus, 
Lybia or Syria) are not really actively involved with the ENP because of (possibly contingent) 
political reasons. They could become involved, even deeply involved, if the political obstacles 
are overcome. 
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concerned).16 In the single year 2003 only the net contributions (in terms of effective 
expenditure and receipts) amounted (in million Euros) to 3361.7 for Greece, 8706.5 for Spain, 
3475.4 for Portugal, 1560 for Ireland (not any more among the poor, but still treated as such). 
Adding up we obtain 17,102, markedly more than the amount earmarked for the 
neighbourhood policy for the whole seven years of the Financial Perspective. If we also 
consider the much larger population and poorer conditions of the neighbours, presumably in 
greater need of assistance, in relation to that of the EU (15) poorest four, the disproportion 
becomes really impressive.17 Moreover the appropriation for the ENP includes funds for 
regional cooperation which will be spent in a still undetermined proportion inside the EU, and, 
of the total appropriation for the ENPI, more than half is foreseen to be actually spent in the 
year 2013 and later.18 Similar, if somewhat attenuated, considerations apply to the year 2005, 
when the net contribution of the EU budget to the net recipient countries was 17501 million 
Euros (of which 13433 going to the old four net recipients and 4069 to the new ten ones).19 
Going into detail, and considering the extent of net transfers in per capita terms, one is left 
with an astonishing difference between the assistance provided to the four older members and 
that to the new poorer ones (see the following table).20  
                                                 
16 Cf. European Commission, “Allocation of 2004 EU Expenditure by Member State” 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/agenda2000/reports_en.htm), p. 142. 
17 Of course there may be the issue of the possible different degree of absorption capability, 
but it seems difficult that this difference may compensate the difference in the degree of 
financial commitments. 
18 Cf. Commission of the European Communities, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council Laying Down General Provisions Establishing a European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument”, Brussels, 29.9.2004, p. 36 
(http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2004/com2004_0628en01.pdf). To make the 
comparison between the financial assistance to neighbourhood and present poorer member 
fairer, one should consider that assistance by the EU is only a part of overall development 
assistance neighbours receive, and one may well assume that in case a neighbour were to 
become a member of EU, the sources of assistance outside the EU could dry up. (For the data 
on Official Development Aid reported in the OECD site 
(http://www.oecd.org/countrylist/0,2578,en_2649_34447_25602317_1_1_1_1,00.html.) 
19 Cf. European Commission, “Allocation of 2005 EU expenditure by Member State”, 
September 2006, p. 138 
(http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/documents/revenue_expenditure/agenda_2000/allocrep_20
05_en.pdf).  
20 One may be struck in particular by the following cases: the Czek Republic vs. Greece, 
countries of same population size and not too different per capita incomes, and Poland and 
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PER CAPITA CONTRIBUTIONS TO NET RECIPIENT COUNTRIES 2005 
Country Population1 PPP per capita US $1 Net per capita 
contribution 
from EU budget 
(Euros)2
New Europe 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Poland 
Czek Rep. 
Cyprus 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Estonia 
Malta 
Hungary 
TOTAL  
5,423,567 
2,011,473 
38,626,349 
10,246,178 
775,927 
2,306,306 
3,607,899 
1,341,664 
396,851 
10,032,375 
74,768,589  
16,100 
21,600 
13,300 
19,500 
21,500 
13,200 
13,700 
16,700 
19,900 
16,300  
50 
50 
48 
17 
116 
114 
132 
115 
227 
59 
54  
Old Europe 
Ireland 
Portugal 
Spain 
Greece 
TOTAL  
3,969,558 
1,052,4145 
40,280,780 
10,647,529 
65,422,012  
41000 
19300 
25500 
22200  
286 
225 
149 
366 
205  
 
1From CIA, World Factbook 2005. 2European Commission, Allocation of 2005 EU expenditureby Member State.Sept. 2006, p. 
138.  http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/documents/revenue_expenditure/agenda_2000/allocrep_2005_en.pdf 
 
The obvious explanation lies in the fact that assistance to new members was decided when 
they were still outside the EU21 and their clout in the internal dynamics of EU decisions was 
limited. Moreover, enlargement, as one would have expected of any decision taken at 
unanimity, tends to happen according to a Pareto principle, by which there cannot be losers, 
including the previous net beneficiaries from EU contributions, contrary to what equity and 
good common sense may suggest. In the logic of Prodi’s argument (“the quality of our 
relations with them will largely depend on their performance and the political will on either 
side”) one could not justify the different treatment, since the neighbours were so close to the 
EU that they could be admitted into the Club. On the other hand, one may expect that the 
contribution in favour of the new members will increase in time, both because of their coming 
                                                                                                                                                         
Spain, countries of comparable size, but with very unequal treatment as far as financial 
assistance is concerned. 
21 At the December 2002 Copenhagen European Council (cf. Susan Senior Nello, The 
European Union: Economics, Policy, History. Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill, 2005, p. 20). 
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of age as insiders into the power dynamics of the EU, and because of the gradual adaptation 
during the next financial perspective of the agricultural handouts.22
On the basis of the above figures one may appreciate the much lower degree of consideration 
for the interests of neighbours than for the interests of members and, to a lesser extent, 
prospective members. Thus it is obvious that on this account alone the neighbourhood policy 
(as well as the economic assistance to potential candidates) cannot really reduce the drive of 
neighbouring European countries towards possible accession.  
3. MARKET ACCESS.  
What about the main aspect of Prodi’s promise: the stake in the EU internal market? Part of 
the difficulties may lie in the adaptation of the neighbours to internal market requirements. 
This may be rendered relatively more difficult since EU financial aid for assistance in law-
making and administrative reform to the willing neighbours would be lower, owing to the 
overall amounts involved, than for the candidate and potential candidate countries. However 
the neighbours really keen to completely adapt their own legislation to the Eu’s may not be so 
many. But the main issue here is that one would hardly expect the EU to completely open up 
its market in the more sensitive areas, where most of its neighbours could better compete, in 
particular agriculture,23 over and above what would be required in an eventual (however 
unlikely by now) conclusion of the Doha WTO round.24 Only in case of entry into the EU 
would the access to the internal market be necessarily complete. The arrangement for market 
access that Prodi had in mind when launching the ENP, and to which he explicitly referred to, 
was the European Economic Area (EEA). The latter however does not imply complete 
integration in the EU market, insofar the EEA is a Free Trade Area and not a Customs Union 
(implying the need to constantly refer in trade to rules of origin, even if “the rules concerning 
                                                 
22 Cf. Senior Nello, op. cit., p. 123. 
23 See on this point Heather Grabbe, “How the Eu Should Help Its Neighbours.” Centre for 
European Reform Policy Brief, June 2004 (ww.cpr.co.uk).  
24 Indeed present Partnership and Cooperation agreements that regulate the economic relations 
of the EU with its Eastern neighbours “are little but codification of WTO principles for non-
WTO members.” (A. Aaslund, and A. Warner, ‘The EU Enlargement: Consequences for the 
CIS Countries’ in: Dabrowski, M., Slay, B. and Neneman, J. (2004). Beyond Transition: 
Development Perspectives and Dilemmas. Ashgate, quoted in Susanne Milcher and Ben Slay, 
“The Economics of the ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’: An Initial Assessment.” 
Conference paper to the conference on Europe After the Enlargement, Warsaw, 8-9 April 
2005, p.9.) 
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processing of products and documentation of the origin of products are simplified” and, 
considering customs cooperation and simplified formalities “manufacturers in EFTA countries 
operate under approximately the same conditions as manufacturers in the EU”).25 Moreover, 
even if the EEA implies a deep integration with EU in a number of areas (among others 
services and public procurements, and free movement of capital and labour)26 the free trade 
area is not all comprehensive. In particular, agriculture and fisheries are in principle excluded. 
A relevant consideration, relating to issue of the previous section, is that the three EFTA EEA 
countries are net contributors to the EU budget, while neighbours are in general net recipients 
of aid, and they would much more so in case of equal treatment with EU poorer members 
(“everything but institutions”). Turkey has a customs union with the EU, but here too the 
customs union is highly incomplete, since, in particular, it does not include agricultural 
products, where Turkey should have a comparative advantage, nor services, and the EU can 
block alleged destabilizing imports through antidumping clauses.27 The advantage of a free 
trade area is that, unlike a customs union, it allows members to enter independently into other 
similar arrangements. This is of particular importance, for instance, in the case of the Ukraine 
whose possible entering in a free trade area with the EU does not exclude the possibility of a 
similar arrangement with Russia, but the rules of origin implied by a free trade area can be 
pretty onerous.28
                                                 
25 Cf. Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,“Norway, The European Economic Area 
(EEA) and the EU's Internal Market”. October 1995 
(http://odin.dep.no/odin/engelsk/norway/eu/032001-990083/index-dok000-b-n-a.html). For the 
discipline concerning rules of origin and cumulation in the EEA, see Protocol 4, on Rules of 
Origin, in the EEA agreement: 
http://secretariat.efta.int/Web/EuropeanEconomicArea/EEAAgreement/protocols/changed_pro
tocols/protocol4.pdf 
26 Integration extends to the areas of enhanced cooperation, such as, for Norway, Schengen 
cooperation and the Dublin convention (relating respectively to the treatment of refugees and 
asylum seekers). 
27 For a detailed analysis of the customs union agreement between the EU and Turkey, see 
Halûk Kabaalioglu, "Completion of the Customs Union and the Accession of Turkey to the 
European Union", Third Ecsa-World Conference: The European Union In A Changing World. 
Bruxelles 19 - 20 Septembre 1996.  
http://www.ecsanet.org/conferences/ecsaworld3/kabaalioglu.htm.
28 See Olga Shumylo, “Ukraine and the European Neighbourhood Policy. Ensuring the Free 
Movement of Goods and Services.” CEPS Working Document No. 240/March 2006, p. 10. By 
late Russia seems to have become rather impatient with Ukraine’s attempts not to compromise 
its possibilities of integration with the EU, pushing instead Ukraine, though the leverage of its 
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A general difficulty in a EEA type of arrangement is the need to adapt almost automatically to 
the changing EU legislation relating to the single market. In case of membership, EU 
legislation would automatically apply (aside from the internal legislative adaptations that are 
anyway due). In case of EFTA countries that are EEA members, adaptation is practically 
immediate, but the procedure is somewhat cumbersome and does not seem likely that it could 
be easily repeated with other neighbours. From the point of view of national politics the need 
of almost automatically adapting to a legislation with no share in its production, and with no 
prospect of entering the Union and of sharing eventually decision powers (such as it would be 
the case with the non-European defined countries) could be seen as hardly acceptable. Finally, 
of the four liberties, the one concerning the movement of people would be particularly 
problematic. In the recent enlargement it has been limited, but only temporarily; even such an 
arrangement would be hardly conceivable with respect to the poorer, and demographically 
much more important, neighbours, while an arrangement allowing free movement would be 
hardly possible because its destabilizing effect on the EU, owing to the massive movements of 
population it would entail, and would anyway be politically unfeasible. In the end, what seems 
a more reasonable approach with neighbours is, rather then the EEA model, a more symmetric 
one, based on a free trade area.29 As we have already seen in the case of the Ukraine, an 
additional advantage besides symmetry is pluralism: the possibility for neighbours of entering 
in additional free trade areas besides the EU. In the end the access to the internal market 
depends on the meeting of two wills: the will of the EU of going against organized internal 
sectoral interests opposing free trade, and the will of the neighbours to adapt. Both are 
probably hard to come by, unless the prospect of membership is in sight. 
4. THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY AS SOFT IMPERIALISM 
What is particularly striking of the ENP is its asymmetric aspect. It is for the neighbours to 
adapt to the values and relevant legal production of the EU, not vice-versa. This is basically 
                                                                                                                                                         
energy dependency, towards the construction of a Single Economic Space (with Russia 
Belarus and Kazakhstan), and, in the meantime, towards a customs union, which would be 
incompatible with a free trade area arrangement with the EU (see Jamestown Foundation, 
Eurasia Daily Monitor -- Volume 3, Issue 160, Thursday, August 17, 2006). 
29 Possibly with the extension to Neighbourhood countries of the Pan European Cumulation 
System.  
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the reason why a proud nation, of imperial past, such as Russia,30 has not agreed to this 
approach, even if in practice in the economic relations with the EU it is for Russia to adapt to 
EU standards and regulations, rather then the other way round: here economic size and 
interests matter.31 Even candidate countries must adapt, but the framework is completely 
different: adaptation is the price to be admitted to the Club, where all members in principle 
have equal dignity and partake of decisional power, according to statutory rules. With 
neighbourhood policy no co-decisional powers are envisaged.32 As to the EEA model, on 
which the ENP was modelled, admission to the EU was available, but was declined.  
In a sense the ENP approach can be seen as part of the drive of the West towards the Rest to 
export as superior its own institutional and cultural model, democracy, human rights, the rule 
of law, the market, and which is reflected, among others, in the post-war international 
institutions (starting with the United Nations). This kind of soft imperialism may be seen as 
partly dictated, aside from the conviction of having the “right model” to spread in the interest 
of everybody concerned, by the selfish interest to survive and continue to prosper: eventually, 
economically and militarily, and not only demographically, the Rest (in particular the East) 
will be ahead of the West. Only the absorption by the Rest of the values and institutions of the 
West can allow for the West a destiny of quietly merging with a kind of multiplication of 
                                                 
30 And, one must add, with geopolitical ambitions out of tune with its economic size and 
institutional strength: even if in the present moment of high energy prices Russia tends to 
translate its market power as an energy supplier into political power, the overall PPP size of 
the Russian economy is estimated at about the same as Italy’s, and a sixth of China (cf. 
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html). 
31 However “Russia is unhappy about the EU demanding that Russia adopt its norms and rules, 
even though Russia does not intend to join the EU, no one is waiting for it there and its 
problems cannot be solved within this structure” (Nina Kulikova, “Is Russia-EU strategic 
partnership possible?” RIA Novost,15-11-2004, 
http://kaliningradexpert.org/index.php?doc=800&lng=eng). Instead of the Neighbourhod 
Policy there is the notion of a Common European Economic Space, which is a rather hazy and 
undetermined concept. For a concise but sharp discussion see Christer Pursiainen, “The 
Ambiguity of the Common European Economic Space: a Strength or a Weakness?”, Russian-
European Centre for Economic Policy, 26/7/04 
http://www.recep.ru/files/documents/04_07_26_Economic_Space_En.pdf (accessed 13/2/05). 
See also, of the same author “Theories of Integration and the Limits of EU-RF Relations”, 
Russian-European Centre for Economic Policy, 25/10/2004, 
http://www.recep.ru/en/documents.php. 
32 However, unilateral approximation is already required in the framework of Association 
Agreements for countries that have no perspective to join the EU. See for instance art. 40 and 
52 of the 1998 EU-Tunisia Association Agreement. 
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itself. To some such a kind of soft imperialism with a jusnaturalistic bend may sometimes 
appear as abstract and antihistorical, insofar as it does not take into consideration actual 
situations, historical background, particularities and possibilities, and does not respect 
alternative views and systems of organization. In particular, western liberalism is basically not 
tolerant of intolerance.  
In practice, in the actual behaviour of EU relations with its neighbours the theoretical 
principles are forcibly bent and adapted to concrete situations, as much so as to lead to a lack 
of coherence between practice and theory. As an example let us consider two parallel cases of 
the economic relations of the EU towards two neighbours that have some interesting aspects in 
common, Tunisia and Belarus. Both countries, of analogous size, are ruled by autocratic 
presidents. President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali appears no less autocratic than President 
Lukaszenko of Belarus, and possibly more, if as a rough index of autocracy we take the 
percentage of votes attributed in presidential elections (Ben Ali 94.48% in October 2004; 
Lukaszenko 85% in 2001).33 Both presidents enjoyed constitutional referenda allowing them 
to continue their office after reaching the maximum number of mandates allowed by the 
Constitution (Ben Ali in 2002, Lukaszenko in 2004). The reaction of the EU has been quite 
different: the freezing since 1996 of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Belarus 
may be contrasted with Tunisia’s continuous enjoyment of an Association Agreement. The 
different reaction of the EU could be explained by the fact that what may seem normal for an 
African country, albeit relatively better educated (literacy rate 74.2%), such as Tunisia, may 
seem less natural in a well educated (literacy rate 99.6%) European country such as Belarus.34 
Moreover there is the issue of the outside option. As far as Belarus is concerned, one could 
hardly expect any other alternative set-up but some kind of liberal democracy. For Arab 
countries such as Tunisia, the dreaded alternative could is an Islamic regime. On the other 
hand Belarus regime too seems to be conservative rather than expansionistic35 (such as instead 
                                                 
33 Data taken from Wikipedia, www.wikipedia.org; BBC country profiles 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles). 
34 For some more articulated data on the levels of educational attainment, see the ILO database 
(Key Indicators of The Labour Market, 3-third ed., 2003, in particular table A2). 
35 Authoritarian regimes that are conservative rather than expansionistic (say, Egypt, Tunisia 
or even Belarus) do not pose as such a threat to peaceful coexistence, while authoritarian 
regimes that are expansionistic (such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq or present day Iran) do, as do 
regimes that because of their repressive behaviour or ineffective governance push their 
citizens into mass emigration. One may add however that there have also been plenty of 
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one may perceive the present trend of Putin’s Russia to be), and as such does not seem to put 
the interests of the EU at risk. Albeit authoritarian and repressive, Belarus is still a neighbour 
with whom the EU shares a border and relevant security interests. To aid and help it (such as 
the EU has done with the Tunisian regime) would be excessive, but to deal with it without 
specific and emphasized sanctions could be more appropriate,36 and perhaps even more 
conducive to a change of regime if it were to bring about a softening of its propensities for 
retrenchment.37
5. SOME INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
In order to overcome the difficulties of getting more neighbours as members into the EU a 
more limited form of membership has been proposed.38 One could also envisage a kind of 
enhanced neighbourhood à la carte. For instance, Turkey, whose prospective full membership 
raises so many perplexities for political and demographic reasons, could be admitted to take 
part, of the three pillars, only in the single market and, with full decisional status, in relation to 
economic issues only. Of the four freedoms the one relating to free movement of people could 
be denied, and not only, as in the case of the recent enlargement, as a temporary measure. A 
progressively more extended membership could follow Turkey’s progress, if any, in the 
relevant areas. But this may be seen as politically unpalatable. As a more far-reaching and 
plausible solution an alternative membership with more limited powers should be envisaged 
for all the members, as the extent of the present rights of any individual member could be 
incompatible not only with further enlargement, but with the progress, and indeed with the 
continuous smooth functioning of the European Union.39 This applies in particular to voting 
                                                                                                                                                         
examples of expansionistic democracies, putting the stability and integrity neighbours, and 
even of distant nations, at risk. Democracy, unfortunately, is no absolute guarantee of peaceful 
restraint. 
36 As an example of collaboration between Belarus and its western neighbours one may refer 
to the Söderköping process. The objective of the latter is “To address the cross-border co-
operation issues arising with the EU enlargement eastwards and to promote dialogue on 
asylum and irregular migration issues among the countries situated along the EU eastern 
border.” Cf. http://soderkoping.org.ua/.  
37 As a blatant case of a authoritarian long surviving regime, notwithstanding harsh political 
and economic sanctions by the US, including a trade embargo, leading to retrenchment rather 
than collapse, one may recall Castro’s Cuba.  
38 Cf. “Meet the Neighbours.” Economist, June 23rd 2005. 
39 As an instance of the obnoxious enactment of unanimity requirements and implied veto 
powers, one may mention in the past enlargement the stubborn requirement of Greece of 
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and blocking rights, and to the practical right of not being sanctioned for non-compliance to 
membership obligations (even the theoretical sanctions for violating the Maastricht conditions 
have been practically ineffective, as the experience has proved; at any rate the sanctioning 
system is weakened by the condition that the required fines must be paid by the offending 
parties, and it is unclear what would happen in case of non-compliance).40 As to the 
suspension of a EU member, the condition of unanimity at some point in the procedure 
(maintained in the failed Constitutional Treaty) seems to render any such comprehensive 
sanction highly improbable.41 A more subtle and flexible system of sanctions is needed, such 
as for instance an almost automatic exclusion from the relevant European decisional bodies in 
case of important violation of some aspects of the Treaty. For instance, the countries violating 
the Maastricht conditions, so long as the violation lasts, could be excluded from the meeting of 
the Council of Economics and Finance Ministers, and from the decision processes relating to 
economic matters, or their voting powers could be taken away or reduced, unless, say, a 
qualified majority of the European Council decides to the contrary. Countries not abiding by 
community regulations concerning, say, agricultural matters, such as in the case of Italy’s 
handling of the milk quotas, could be excluded from the meetings of the agricultural ministers 
and from decisions concerning agriculture. Some reduction or suspension of payments from 
the EU budget could be also envisaged. Analogous measures could be applied in regard to 
other important violations in other areas. Whenever possible the violation should be declared 
by a non-political body such as the European Court of Justice, or, perhaps, by a qualified 
majority of the European Parliament. Moreover the stage prescribed by art. 7(2) in the 
suspension procedure should require a qualified majority rather than unanimity. If the 
sanctioning and excluding system is more effective, new members can be admitted more 
wholeheartedly, with less danger that a change in their internal setup may eventually rock the 
                                                                                                                                                         
admission to the EU of the divided  (and geographically Asian) island of Cyprus, In order not 
to rock the whole enlargement procedure Cyprus was admitted, hoping that in process of 
admission it would re-unite, but avoiding making of re-unification a requirement for 
admission. The result has been the internalization into the EU of the unsolved issue of the 
status of Cyprus, complicating the already complicated relations with Turkey, without the 
admission into the EU being able to contribute to its solution. In a sense Cyprus admission 
functions as a kind poison pill in EU-Turkey negotiations. 
40 See art. 104 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community. 
41 Cf. art. 7 of The Treaty on European Union, concerning suspension of “certain of the rights 
deriving from the application of this Treaty to the Member State in question, including the 
voting rights of the representative of the government of that Member State in the Council.” 
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Union through stubborn and reckless use of veto powers. Moreover, as the power of any single 
member would be accordingly reduced, membership itself could become something less of an 
issue. But will ever the egotism of the old nation states be able to suffer such a sizable 
reduction in their cherished prerogatives? 42
In the meantime, in the enlightened interest of the EU itself, neighbours (and in particular 
Turkey that already has an incomplete customs union with the EU, as well as long-standing 
and frustrated membership aspirations) should be granted the maximum access to the EU 
market, up to possible complete integration. The latter implies in turn a willingness by 
neighbours to open up completely their markets and to adapt their relevant legislation to that 
of the EU, as well as by the EU to renounce the defence of their non-competitive sectors, first 
of all agriculture. While the first conditions may be willingly accepted by some neighbours, it 
may seem difficult that the internal dynamics of the EU, and the power of concentrated 
interests, could allow to bring about the second, notwithstanding Prodi’s promise, and the fact 
that increased trade and phasing out the protection and subsidisation, in particular, of EU 
agriculture, would be in the best overall interest of EU members themselves. But EU’s 
effective developments may eventually dispel the seemingly most realistic pessimism, and 
prove it as unrealistic, as has been the case many times in the past. Let us therefore end with a 
glimmer of hope. 
                                                 
42 Even if the project of the new European Constitution has been, at least momentarily shelved, 
obviously the reform process of EU institutions will not stop here, owing to the need of reform 
induced, in particular, by the enlarged membership. It may be maintained that even if the 
European Constitution were ratified, the reforms in the decisional process would have been 
insufficient for guaranteeing a satisfactory functioning of the EU with the new membership, 
and moreover that the sanctions foreseen for lack of compliancy to the rules by member states 
would have continued to be utterly inadequate. (For a theoretical analysis of the much greater 
difficulty of reaching decisions with the new membership, and of the issue of the voting rules, 
see Richard Baldwin, Charles Wyplosz, op. cit., pp. 84-86.) One may also add that decision 
making could be rendered more difficult by the greater heterogeneity of the Union after the 
enlargement, as synthesized by the much greater disparity in per capita incomes than under 
previous enlargements, with possible greatly heterogeneity of preferences between the 
member states. But the issue of deepening vs. widening, where the latter is considered to be 
better compatible with maintaining the sovereign powers of the component nation states, is an 
old, even if perhaps somewhat misleading one, since the wider the membership the greater the 
supranational powers required to keep the Union together and to ensure the fulfilment of its 
functions, however limited they be, and the lesser the power of any single state to influence 
EU decisions. 
